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The transformation of the United States Army to a combat force capable of 
operating successfully on future battlefields requires the leveraging of digital 
communication capabilities to support distributed battle command. The purpose of this 
study is to investigate collaborative command group planning performance in traditional 
face-to-face (collocated) and geographically dispersed group (distributed) conditions. The 
Reactive Planning Strategies Simulation (REPSS) system was developed to provide a 
realistic group planning task supporting empirical estimates of planning process and 
performance outcome success, measured in this context as delivery rate of humanitarian 
supplies. 
Results indicate that synchronization scores were not significantly different 
between conditions; however, they were highly correlated with command group 
humanitarian supply delivery rates when collapsed across both collocated and distributed' 
conditions. Furthermore, collocated command groups delivered humanitarian supplies at 
a higher rate than did distributed command groups. This difference was primarily due to 
the cumulative effect of poor decision making across the multiple decision points 
required of the command groups during the exercise. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
Currently the United States Army is in a state of transition to a future combat 
force, one that will rely heavily upon a suite of computer systems known as the Future 
Combat System of Systems (Grossman et al., 2002; Riggs, 2002). In order to be capable 
of operating successfully on future battlefields, the Future Force will require the 
leveraging of digital communication capabilities to support distributed battle command. 
In this environment, distributed refers to a group of people who, although not in the same 
geographic location, are making command decisions as a group. Command group 
planning skills require more than a one-time effort to develop a plan. For example, the 
command group process should facilitate a shared awareness of challenging (even 
contradictory) demands and support the swift and flexible adjustment of plans during 
execution in response to feedback gathered from the battlefield. Timely decision-making 
is key to command group success (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001; Thomas, Gilman, & 
McKearney, 2004). 
The cost of poor decision making, particularly in military settings, can be 
staggering: consider the casualties of soldiers and civilians, needless financial 
expenditures, and the possible endangerment of national security. Hence, it is paramount 
that research is conducted to identify the possible effects of command group setting in the 
collaboration process. Specifically, the research will investigate command group 
collaborative performance in face-to-face (i.e., collocated) and geographically separated 
(i.e., distributed) settings to identify performance differences in key areas. 
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Collaboration refers to the process of sharing information in order to work 
together towards a common goal (Yen, Wen, Binshan, & Chou, 1999). Alberts, Ganske, 
Hayes, & Signori (2001) also noted that the sharing of information requires a proactive 
effort. Collaboration involves the active, conscious sharing of information to achieve a 
common end result. Hence, distributed collaboration refers to the cooperation and 
communication of people who are not in the same geographic location. 
CHAPTER 2 
Literature Review 
The transition toward distributed collaboration has evolved in business 
organizations as well as in the military. Commerce is increasingly moving toward multi-
national, geographically separated organizations, with activities coordinated and 
integrated via information technology. This globalization of the business world has 
forced organizations to deal with constant change and the need for quick and efficient 
communication (Greer et al., 1998; Longworth, 2003). In recognition of this digital 
environment, virtual meetings, teams, and online conferencing have become 
commonplace. 
Early military research focused on the role of technology in distributed 
communication and command group collaboration (Maybury, 1995). The primary 
concerns were the ability of command groups to effectively utilize the collaborative tools 
in use and how to improve such collaborative technologies to support communication. 
More recently, distributed collaboration has been enhanced by faster personal computers, 
increased network and communication bandwidth, and more capable digital media 
(McKenna, 2001). This has allowed the design and implementation of more user-friendly 
interfaces, which has minimized cognitive demands placed upon the users. 
Adelman, Miller and Yeo's (2004) study on the role of computer icons in maintaining 
information flow has shown how research findings can be utilized to improve command 
groups communication. Improvements to online collaborative tools have also helped to 
reduce group member isolation (Richardson & Hansen, 2005), enabled command groups 
to orchestrate their interactions (Greenberg, 2002), and prompted further research and 
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development of distributed collaborative tools (Gutwin & Greenberg, 2004). These 
technological advances (as well as the increase of computer usage in everyday life) have 
noticeably improved the basic computer skills of the average user (Pleban, Eakin, Salter, 
& Matthews, 2001). The emphasis on technology has thus shifted from understanding the 
basic concepts of computers to staying up to date with information technology. 
Currently, research is focusing on the problem of human interaction and group 
dynamics in distributed environments. Previous research efforts have suggested that 
members of collocated and distributed command groups differ significantly in how they 
collaborate with one another (Holden et al., 2004; Lickteig, Sanders, Durlach, & 
Carnahan, 2003; Sanders et al., 2006). 
These differences can significantly and adversely impact communications 
between members of both collocated and distributed command groups, although arguably 
more so in the latter. It is therefore not surprising that research has focused on the 
identification of the means by which these differences can be minimized (e.g., providing 
command groups with information from automated reports, shared office capabilities, 
distributed map graphics, and templates for displaying, comparing, and revising plans). 
All of the previous examples can be used to conceptually define command and control. 
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of assets 
employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces 
and operations in the accomplishment of the mission (Department of the Army, 2004). 
An important area of inquiry is the relationship between computer-mediated 
communication and the ability of distributed command groups to share information in a 
timely and effective manner (Garbis & Artman, 1998). 
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Research conducted by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) indicates that collocated command groups engage in fast and flexible verbal 
exchanges most of the time (Lickteig, Sanders, Durlach, Lussier, & Carnahan, 2004). 
However, distributed command group members communicate less frequently and do so 
via traditional, sequential communications (i.e., staff briefings; Holden et al., 2004). 
Consequently, the exchanges were not timely, less information was shared, and repetition 
of information was necessary to maintain shared situational awareness. Furthermore, 
collocated communication supports physical interaction, shared activities (including non-
mission related activities), as well as informal interactions and attentional control, all of 
which are vital components to successful group decision-making (Lickteig et al., 2003; 
Nardi & Engestrom, 1999). Such deficiencies exhibited in distributed environments 
decrease the likeliness of successful decisions (Department of the Army, 2003). 
Despite the subtle differences in the settings between the two projects (Holden et 
al., 2004; Lickteig et al., 2004), the results suggest that collocated and distributed 
command groups exhibit sharply divergent communication patterns. Shared situational 
awareness and effective collaborative communications, which are characteristic of 
successful groups, are maintained more easily in collocated settings. This process is easy 
to maintain in collocated settings in which people can easily sustain timely, up-to-the-
moment collective understanding of a shared workspace (Crampton, 2001; Grinter, 
Herbsleb, & Perry, 1999; Gutwin et al., 2002). In the case of the distributed groups, these 
characteristics are quite likely handicapped as the maintenance of an accurate, up-to-date 
shared mental model is inherently more difficult in this setting (Gutwin & Greenberg, 
2002; Hoegl & Proserpio, 2004). 
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Even with these recognized constraints in distributed collaboration, many 
organizations are adopting distributed collaborative systems (Holden et al., 2004). The 
expectation is that through better use of technology and improved command group 
training, distributed collaboration can support accurate and timely exchange of 
information (Lickteig et al., 2003). In addition, distributed collaboration is presumed to 
be more cost efficient (Boudreau, Loch, Robey, & Straub, 1998). This assumption holds 
true, however, only if the expected efficiency gains are not offset by decrements in 
information sharing ability. The logical inference is that emphasis of command group 
training should be based on empirical knowledge of the differences between collocated 
and distributed communication patterns (Cannon-Bowers & Salas, 1997). 
To investigate the impact of distributed settings on command group collaboration 
performance, the Reactive Planning Strategies Simulation (REPSS) system was designed 
to simulate a simplified United States Army stability and reconstruction operation-
planning task. The REPSS system was specifically designed to require a minimum of 
military doctrinal and technical knowledge and skills. It was also designed to provide 
relevant metrics for both collaboration solution performance outcome and cognitive 
processes (Sanders et al., 2006). The REPSS system incorporates the requirements for a 
distributed command group research environment as described by Lickteig et al. (2002). 
Previous research focused on a similar command group resource allocation mission; 
however, said research investigated distributed command groups making a single 
planning decision (Lussier, 1990; 1992). Lussier's findings indicated that distributed 
command groups, on average, performed more poorly than did collocated groups. 
However, Lussier also recommended utilizing an iterative planning process in which 
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command group plans needed to be adapted across multiple iterations. The findings 
established minimalist criteria for, as well as isolating behaviors typical of, success and 
failure. These criteria provided useful guidance in the initial stages of REPSS system 
development. 
REPSS was designed to have "face validity" for soldiers. Participants, as part of a 
peacekeeping mission, are instructed to provide humanitarian supplies for four separate 
towns. The exercise requires command group members to collaborate in optimizing the 
allocation of limited resources (i.e., food, transportation, and security) necessary to 
provide weekly food shipments to four towns over a period of four weeks. Funds 
provided for the purchase of these resources are limited, increasing the need for 
synchronization. The goal is to maximize the delivery of humanitarian support 
throughout the iterative collaborative planning process. The information for each town 
(i.e., population, enemy threat level, and citizen morale) is the basis upon which 
participants allocate resources necessary for successful delivery. The threat conditions for 
each town are recalculated each week based on the proportion of required humanitarian 
relief supplies that were successfully delivered to each town. Hence, a plan that results in 
a higher amount of humanitarian supplies being delivered increases the morale and 
decreases the threat level of the town. 
REPSS command groups are composed of a Commander and three, two-person 
teams: Supply Team, Transportation Team, and Security Team. Estimated costs for food 
and medical supplies, transportation, and security personnel were gleaned from available 
information sources about Azerbaijan (Central Intelligence Agency, 2006; Defense 
Logistics Agency, 2006; Finfacts Ireland, 2006). 
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Participants use shared data base information sources, text-messaging, data 
matrices, and voice communications to develop a weekly spending plan to support four 
separate towns across four weeks. The plan is entered via the REPSS on-screen resource 
request forms. The reaction of the environment to the allocation of supplies each week 
comes to the command group members in the form of pre-written text messages 
indicating losses and damage proportional to the shortfall in supplies delivered (Sanders, 
et al., 2006). 
The calculations were computed by determining the percentage of humanitarian 
supplies that successfully arrived at a respective town. Town morale fell into one of five 
categories, ranging from Very Low to Very High. Each of these categories were initially 
quantitatively represented by a percentage: 
• Very Low = 0% 
• Low = 20% 
• Neutral = 40% 
• High = 60% 
• Very High = 80% 
For example, if a command group delivers 75% of the humanitarian supplies 
required for a town with a High morale (60%), then all the supplies will be delivered, no 
damage from attacks by civilians or insurgents will occur, and the morale for the town the 
next week will be half the difference between the delivery rate and the morale percentage 
added to the existing morale percentage. In this case that would result in morale 
percentage of 67.5% (75 - 60 = 15, 15/2 = 7.5, 60 + 7.5 = 67.5%), for an increase of 
7.5%. 
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On the other hand, if the same command group delivers 60% of the humanitarian 
supplies to a town with Very High morale (80%), the resulting drop in civilian morale 
will cause the townsfolk to shift their support to the insurgents. As a result, the insurgents 
will attack the supply convoys. Those attacks will cause damage to supply vehicles, 
warehouses, security personnel, and the supplies themselves. The severity of the damage 
is calculated in the following manner: the amount of supplies delivered (60%) is 
subtracted by the morale percentage (80%), resulting in a -20%. This percentage is 
divided into the total amount spent by the command group on supply vehicles, 
warehouses, security personnel, and supplies for that town. This result is the financial 
penalty subtracted from the command group's available funds for the following week. 
Furthermore, this 20% difference is halved and is deducted from the existing morale 
percentage for the town and results in the percentage for the following week. In this 
example, that would result in a morale percentage of 70% for the following week. 
Samples of the REPSS reaction messages were evaluated by a Senior Analyst for 
the Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL). This person served as a Subject Matter 
Expert (SME) to determine feasibility, realism, and appropriate level of impact of the 
messages. The SME, a retired Command Sergeant Major of the Army, also assessed the 
level of detail and description provided by the messages. He deemed the messages were 
satisfactory and suitable for the intentions of the study. 
Present Study 
The present study utilized the REPSS program to investigate the command group 
synchronization and humanitarian supply delivery rate of collocated and distributed 
command groups. This design expanded on previous research that primarily has focused 
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on "one-shot, one-deaF'-type decision making. This does not indicate how command 
groups will perform across a series of repeated collaborative decisions with previous ones 
having significant influence on subsequent decisions in the current example. The present 
study was therefore more ecologically valid than previous efforts and more accurately 
simulates real-world, decision-making processes. 
The research objectives for the current study were to investigate command group 
collaborative planning performance in collocated and distributed conditions. Specifically, 
it was hypothesized that: 
1. Command group plan synchronization, averaged across all four decision points, 
will be significantly greater for the collocated command groups. 
Research indicates that distributed groups have difficulty in developing 
workspace awareness (Crampton, 2001; Grinter, Herbsleb, & Perry, 1999; Gutwin et al., 
2002; Hoegl & Proserpio, 2004), situational awareness (Artman & Garbis, 1988; 
Endsley, 1995; Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995), and synchronization (Fleishman 
& Zaccaro, 1992), all of which are vital to performance in reactive environments. 
2. Across both groups, synchronization scores will be positively and significantly 
correlated with humanitarian supply delivery rates. 
It is hypothesized that command groups collaborative planning task 
synchronization and command group planning task performance outcomes will be 
positively correlated. Synchronization is defined in this context as the ability to work 
jointly and coordinate with others to maximize the planning and subsequent humanitarian 
supply delivery process. 
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Command group collaborative planning task synchronization is calculated by 
dividing the space available on vehicles designated for humanitarian supply delivery per 
town (20 units of space per vehicle) by the number of spaces occupied by security guards 
(1 unit per security guard) and humanitarian supplies (4 units of space per humanitarian 
supply container). If done correctly, it is possible to have an almost foil convoy of 
delivery trucks for every town every week. This emphasized the importance of 
developing efficient convoys resulting in less wasteful financial expenditures and more 
efficient allocation of space, supplies, and personnel. 
3. Therefore, overall command group humanitarian supply delivery rate will be 
significantly higher for collocated command groups. 
To calculate humanitarian supply delivery rate, the supplies necessary to feed 
each town each week is divided by the actual amount provided to each respective town 
each week of the exercise. 
In summary, it is predicted that collocated command groups will have less 
difficulty in establishing workspace awareness, situational awareness, and developing 
synchronized plans. Furthermore, collocated command groups will experience more 
efficient and effective communications. 
CHAPTER 3 
Method 
Participants 
All participants were active duty, United States Army soldiers (N = 98). The 
participants were assigned to a seven-person team (N = 14). Each team was then assigned 
to either the collocated or distributed condition (N = 7, per condition). All participants 
were currently serving in combat, combat-support, or training units at Fort Knox, 
Kentucky (10 command groups, five per condition) or Fort Benning, Georgia (four 
command groups, two per condition). Ten of the fourteen command groups consisted of 
an officer majority (more than 4 participants per groups were Lieutenant to Major grade), 
with all having the Commander and at least one team member being officer grade. 
Participants averaged 7.3 years of military experience. 
The Fort Knox Tasking Officer, Troop Support Office, or Fort Benning Tasking 
Officer assigned participants to the respective days in which they were expected to be 
involved in the research. After being scheduled by the appropriate Tasking Officer, the 
dates in which participants were to arrive were randomly assigned to which experimental 
condition would be conducted that day. Although participants were required to arrive at 
the data collection site, they were afforded the opportunity to not participate in the 
research without penalty. 
Forms 
Multiple surveys were used to gather information about demographics, participant 
workloads, stress, and other factors, as well as deliver instructions to the participants. 
Each of these forms is discussed below. 
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General and Team Instructions. A copy of the General Instructions was provided 
to each participant (Appendix A) at the start of the exercise. Team-specific instructions 
(Supply Team, Motor Transportation Team, and Security Team) were also provided at 
the same time to each corresponding team. Copies of these instructions are provided in 
Appendices B through E. 
After completion of the exercise, participants were instructed to fill out three 
surveys. Descriptions of these surveys are provided below: 
NASA TLX-M. The first survey is a modified National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration Task Load Index (Hart & Staveland, 1988; NASA-Ames Research 
Center, 1986), also known as the NASATLX-M (Appendix F). The modified NASA 
TLX was used to assess the perceived workload, physical and mental stress, and 
performance success of the Commander and team members while performing their 
REPSS tasks. 
Group Roles Questionnaire. Text messages presented in the Group Roles 
Questionnaire are actual messages used in the REPSS system (Appendix G). Participants 
were asked to answer questions designed to test their level of knowledge of information 
available to all group members and information that was team specific. This was to 
determine if participants understood their individual team role in the command group and 
the roles of other teams in the command group. 
Demographic Survey. Finally, the Demographic Survey was used to investigate 
whether participant experience or prior training was associated with planning 
performance outcomes (Appendix H). 
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Apparatus 
Sessions conducted at Fort Knox utilized dual monitor workstations, with two 
participants per station. The monitor to the left of the participants displayed the REPSS 
system, while the monitor to their right displayed the Moffsoft Calculator and the Multi-
echelon Distributed Army Leader's Information Support Training (MEDALIST) 
Whiteboard (Graves et al., 2004; Graves, Jenkins, Flynn, Campbell, & Shadrick, 2005). 
Data collected from participants at Fort Benning, GA, were obtained using a 
single laptop computer for the Commander and for the Supply, Motor Transport, and 
Security Teams, respectively. This was done to improve the portability of the REPSS 
program, and in turn, increase the subject pool. The laptop computers displayed the same 
information provided to Fort Knox participants. Command groups utilizing the laptops 
were instructed on how to minimize and maximize the respective programs, a process 
common to most Microsoft Windows™ products. 
The Moffsoft Calculator™ was provided to each team. The Moffsoft Calculator is 
a computer-based program that records and time stamps all calculations made by 
participants during the study. This is the only calculator participants were allowed to use. 
The MEDALIST whiteboard program allowed two-way communication between 
participants with virtually no time delay. Whiteboards are applications that allow users to 
write, text, or draw within the application to communicate collaboratively in real-time. 
Data was recorded and time stamped through the MEDALIST program. Previous 
independent research by Northrop Grumman Missions Systems (NGMS) established that 
the MEDALIST tools possessed the desired collaborative capabilities necessary to 
support this type of research (Thorson, 2004). 
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Finally, 2-Way Radios were provided to allow voice communications between 
teams as well as with the research team. Voice recordings of command group 
interactions, while not intended to be utilized for analysis in this research endeavor, were 
gathered for use in future research. 
Training 
All participants received a five-minute briefing on the purpose of the study. The 
participants were then separated into teams, after which the participants adjourned to 
their respective distributed team center or to the collocated meeting room. Participants 
were provided ten minutes to read the General Instructions and then another ten minutes 
for the team-specific instructions. 
After reading the instructions, participants received training on how to utilize the 
MEDALIST whiteboard program. A final, brief question and answer period was then 
conducted. Upon completion of the introductory training, teams were provided with a 
paper copy of the exact procedures required to enter data and complete the REPSS 
exercise. 
Upon completion of the training, participants received a computer-based test 
evaluating their understanding of the mission and how to use the REPSS program. None 
of the participants received a failing grade and therefore none were required to repeat the 
training. 
Procedure 
Participants were assigned to group condition prior to their arrival at the research 
site as detailed in the Participants section. Upon their arrival, participants were provided a 
short briefing, separated into their respective teams by the senior officer (in this context, 
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the Commander), and then directed to the appropriate location(s). The exercise began 
after all participants had received training on how to utilize the computer programs used 
in the study. 
The program required groups to develop an iterative plan to be conducted over 
four simulated game weeks. The planning period for the first simulated game week was 
forty minutes, then twenty minutes for each successive simulated game week (Weeks 
Two through Four). At the beginning of the exercise, each group was allocated forty 
minutes to develop their initial plan and to enter these data correctly into the REPSS 
system. Teams then immediately began receiving pre-scripted text messages, sent at the 
fifteen-second mark of the exercise, providing team members with team specific 
information. Commanders were provided with the amount of funds allocated for the 
exercise, Supply Teams with initial citizen population for each town, Motor Transport 
Teams with initial threat level (THREATCON) for the available routes to each town, and 
Security Teams were provided with the initial THREATCON and citizen morale 
(CITMOR) levels for each town. Constructing and implementing a successful planning 
solution necessitated the sharing of information. 
At the thirty- and thirty-five-minute marks, each team was sent pre-scripted text 
messages indicating the time remaining for them to enter their data into the REPSS 
system. If they had not completely entered their data into the system, a message was sent 
at the thirty-eight-minute mark to the Commander to ensure that the teams entered their 
data by the deadline. 
Once data were completely entered into the REPSS system, the Commander and 
team received a text message indicating the successful completion of the planning stage 
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and the beginning of the next week of the exercise. The group then began receiving text 
messages indicating the outcome of their initial plan. Due to the design of the program, 
even an individual team (e.g., Security Team) that performed very well could suffer 
substantial losses if the other teams performed poorly. This could occur if an event that 
affects one team is so significant (e.g., a lack of providing adequate security) that 
damages could be catastrophic in nature. As all teams are working cooperatively, this 
catastrophic event could affect one or all teams. An example of a message received by the 
Security Team is provided in Figure 1. 
Date: Tue Aug 02 16:17:40 EDT 2005 
From: Coalition HQ 
To: Security Team 
Msg: An uprising at the local coalition run prison resulted in a breakout. Some attempted 
to overrun our forces, which left four inmates dead and six wounded. Injuries on our side 
were high. The event occurred on Oscar Route 1. 
Professional Security Guards: 1 was lost. 1 suffered high damage. 2 suffered medium 
damage. 1 suffered low damage. Financial losses were $1803. 
Civilian Security Guards: 2 were lost. 4 suffered high damage. 7 suffered medium 
damage. 7 suffered low damage. Financial losses were $4537. 
Figure 1. An example message sent to the Security Team. 
After all messages were delivered to participant teams, they were provided with a 
twenty-minute session to develop the Week Two spending plan and enter it into the 
REPSS system interface. This process of action (entering the spending amounts for each 
team), reaction (text messages from the REPSS system indicating reaction to the 
participants collaborative plan), and counteraction (the changing of the previous plan) 
continued over four cycles for approximately two hours and ten minutes of real time. 
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After entering data for the final time and receiving confirmatory text messages from the 
system, the exercise was complete. Participants were then provided with their group 
performance scores, which are composite percentages of total supplies delivered, total 
financial expenditures, and total group synchronization. Before being dismissed, 
participants completed the post-research surveys. 
Data Analysis 
Finite financial and temporal resources characterize real world military decisions. 
To construct a credible analog to real-world military decisions, therefore, required that 
there be a finite amount of financial resources available, that there be time constraints, 
and that prior decisions involving the allocation of resources impact (positively or 
negatively) later decisions. 
This approach, however, violates the independence of observations assumption of 
repeated measures AN OVA (Keppel, 1991). Therefore, to test hypothesis 3 (command 
group humanitarian supply delivery rates), following the advice of a recognized statistical 
expert, a quantitative approach was utilized which allowed for the removal of the effects 
of prior week performance (J.M. Cortina, personal communication, August 4, 2006). The 
remaining variance was therefore a function of time itself (not prior week performance) 
and of the collocated/distributed group variable. 
A two-stage analytic approach was used to complete the analysis. First, the 
pattern of raw mean differences and standard deviations was explored qualitatively to 
ascertain how the collocated and distributed command groups differed across the four 
weeks. The goal of this analysis was to attempt to predict what kind of differences might 
be observed in a real world situation analogous to the experimental task. During this 
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process, however, it must be kept in mind that the variables (or combination of variables) 
driving the differences are causally entangled. The first stage of the analysis places the 
emphasis on external validity: that is, making multiple, causally related decisions with 
dwindling resources. 
The second stage of the analysis emphasizes internal validity. That is, the goal is 
to disentangle the causes of the observed differences. The major confound, noted above, 
is the non-independence of observations. Therefore, any analytic approach must be able 
to answer the following question: if the collocated and distributed groups had not differed 
in their decisions in the first week, how different can we expect their performance in 
week two to have been? The same question can be asked of weeks two and three and 
weeks three and four. Furthermore, the analysis must also be done in a fashion that 
allows for the isolation of variance due to the collocated/distributed variable. 
To estimate the impact of previous week performance, the correlation between 
Week Two and Week One was computed, with the impact of condition (collocated vs. 
distributed) partialled out. The resulting beta weight was a measure of the impact of 
Week One on Week Two. This procedure was repeated with Weeks Two and Three, and 
Weeks Three and Four. The resulting beta weights were transformed to percentages and 
these percentages multiplied by the original data for Weeks One through Four. In this 
fashion the impact of the condition on Week Two (with Week One performance 
partialled out) could be isolated. The same applies to Week Three and Four (with the 
effects of Week 2 and Week 3 partialled out, respectively). The resulting performance 
scores, therefore, reflect the performance variance due to time itself and whether or not 
the command groups were collocated or distributed. The resulting data set was then 
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analyzed via a 2 (collocated vs. distributed, between groups) x 4 (weeks 1 -4, within-
groups) ANOVA. 
The over all command group planning task performance outcome was a 
composite score of the percentage of humanitarian supply provided across each town per 
week and for the overall mission. This variable provided the participants with feedback 
regarding their primary mission: providing humanitarian supply to as many people as 
possible. 
The qualitative, or unweighted, analysis of the raw data addressed the hypothesis 
that collocated command group humanitarian supply delivery rate would be higher than 
distributed delivery rates. The quantitative, or weighted, results provide an estimate of the 
command groups' ability to develop a plan (in Week One) and adapt that plan in the face 
of a dynamic environment that requires flexibility and adaptability (Weeks Two through 
Four). Utilizing these two analyses allows a clearer picture to be established of command 
group performance (J.M. Cortina, personal communication, August 4, 2006). 
CHAPTER 4 
Results 
There were no significant differences in any results for command groups from 
Fort Knox when compared to those from Fort Benning. Therefore, Fort Knox and Fort 
Benning data were used for all subsequent analysis (t (12) = .7653,p = .4589). 
Hypothesis 1 
An independent-samples t test was calculated to compare the overall mean scores 
of command group plan synchronization for collocated versus distributed command 
group conditions. The difference between the two groups did not reach statistical 
significance (t (12) = 1.616,p = .066), therefore the hypothesis was not supported. 
Hypothesis 2 
A Pearson correlation coefficient was calculated to estimate the relationship 
between command group plan synchronization and humanitarian supply delivery rate, for 
all four weeks. A strong positive correlation was found (r (12) = .614,p = 011), 
indicating a significant linear relationship between the two variables. This provides 
support for the notion that command groups with better-synchronized plans tend to 
deliver more humanitarian supply. 
Hypothesis 3 
A good estimate of command group collaborative performance success is 
provided by the mean delivery rate per week (see Figure 2). Visual inspection of Figure 2 
indicates that overall, the collocated command groups delivered more humanitarian 
supplies (62.3%) than did distributed command groups (48.1%) across the four weeks, on 
average. Specifically, the delivery rate for the collocated groups was higher than 
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distributed groups for Week One, Three, and Four, with only a small difference in 
delivery rate in Week Two. 
Figure 2. Command Group humanitarian supply delivery rates. 
A 2 x 4 one-way repeated measures analysis of variance comparing collocated 
and distributed command groups' weighted humanitarian supply delivery rates across the 
four weeks within the REPSS exercise failed to find a significant difference between the 
two groups (F (3, 36) = .136, p = .938). These results are shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. Command Group Weighted humanitarian supply delivery rates. 
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When comparing the unweighted results, as shown in Figure 2, collocated and 
distributed command groups do not perform differently at Weeks One and Two, but by 
Weeks Three and Four divergence becomes apparent due to the multiplicative effects of 
poor decision making, in combination with the resulting worsening conditions. This 
highlights the necessity of using multiple decisions points; these results in Weeks Three 
and Four would have not been apparent in a single decision making process. 
This pattern of differences results in drastically different "real-world" outcomes. 
The primary difference between collocated and distributed groups appears to revolve 
around the difficulty in adapting allocation of resources in the face of dynamic 
contingencies determined by dwindling resources and iterative decision points. The 
collocated groups appear to be able to minimize the deleterious effects of non-
independent judgment errors, whereas the distributed groups are less effective at doing 
so. Hence, poor decisions in Weeks One and Two have a more detrimental effect on 
future performance for collocated groups when compared to distributed groups. 
CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
How the United States Army conducts future operations, be it combat operations, 
disaster relief, or stability and reconstruction operations, will likely involve distributed 
command group planning tasks. Research, therefore needs to be undertaken to identify 
the planning processes that support effective command group collaboration. The REPSS 
project addresses human collaborative planning performance issues that are considered 
paramount for the United States Army as it moves into the future. Results from this 
project were consistent with previous research findings utilizing a research product called 
VARWARS. The VARWARS research demonstrated that distributed command groups 
demonstrated poor information collaboration, truncated and inefficient communication, 
and poorer performance in group operations, albeit in a single decision-making exercise 
(Lussier, 1990; 1992). The REPSS research improved upon and expanded group 
collaboration research by examining decisions across multiple time points and by 
establishing how group synchronization played a role in command group performance 
outcomes. 
The first hypothesis, which investigated if collocated command groups developed 
significantly more synchronized plans than did distributed command groups, was not 
supported. 
The second hypothesis was supported in that command group planning 
synchronization was highly and significantly correlated with command group 
collaborative performance. As noted above, prior research has indicated that 
synchronization is an important component of collaboration. Hence, a failure to 
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maximize synchronization can have a detrimental effect on performance. However, 
across all four weeks, the distributed command groups produced more poorly 
synchronized plans than did collocated command groups; however, contrary to 
expectations, this difference was not significant. 
Although significant differences were not evident between collocated and 
distributed command groups, there is statistical support for the statement that command 
group plan synchronization and humanitarian supply delivery rate means are highly 
correlated. This indicates that command group synchronization does play an important 
role in collaborative performance. 
When looking at the unweighted results, noticeable differences exist between 
collocated and distributed groups in Weeks Three and Four. The causal explanation for 
this is the increasingly detrimental impact of poor previous decisions in allocating finite 
resources. This was seen clearly in the weighted means analysis. 
Performance differences were also observed in the kinds of errors made by 
collocated and distributed command groups. For example, distributed command groups 
have less money available at Week Three and Four, run out of funds 70% of the time, and 
perform more catastrophic errors than do collocated command groups. Catastrophic 
errors were defined as: 
1. Failure by one or more team(s) to make any allocation during one week, 
2. Failure by one or more team(s) to make an allocation to one or more towns during 
the week, 
3. Failure to provide any allocation due to running out of time to complete the 
allocation process. 
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The occurrence of catastrophic errors among distributed command groups further 
supports the notion that the distributed environment hinders performance. In the REPSS 
exercise, catastrophic errors serve as a good indication of why similar appearing 
performance in planning and adapting a plan, as depicted in Figure 2 and 3, can result in 
drastically different real-world results. 
There were seven catastrophic errors committed by command groups and all 
seven were committed by the distributed command groups. These errors resulted in a 
cascading effect of ever-more expensive (i.e., financially) and costly (i.e., decreased 
CITMOR, increased THREATCON) environmental outcomes. 
The catastrophic errors all occurred during either the second week or the third 
week of the exercise. From observations of command group planning activities, it appears 
that the catastrophic errors were a major cause of distributed command groups having 
less funds to work with at the start of Week Three (M = $2,290,297) compared to 
collocated command groups (M= $2,611,899), a statistically significant difference (t (12) 
= 2.494, p = .031). A similar pattern appeared for the funds available for Week Four. 
Distributed command groups had on average $117,326 available for the final week of 
planning, while collocated command groups had $626,088 available during the same 
period difference (t (12) = 3.045,/? = .01). Furthermore, of the seven distributed 
command groups, only two actually had funds available at the onset of Week Four and 
were thus capable of making an allocation plan. 
Because the catastrophic errors occurred during Weeks Two and Three (following 
successful performance in Week One) it is difficult to attribute them to lack of 
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understanding, or ability, to utilize the REPSS system. Instead, it is more plausibly due to 
the difficulty of the distributed command groups in adapting their plans in Weeks Two 
through Week Four , which involved the making of decisions in a much more stringent 
time window (20 minutes) than the one present in Week One (40 minutes). 
It should be noted that two of the distributed command groups did have funds 
remaining at the beginning of Week Four. These two command groups exhibited 
behaviors that, if present in distributed command groups, would likely prove beneficial. 
The behaviors exhibited by the two high performing distributed groups (a 60.2% and 
57.9% humanitarian supply delivery rate, respectively) lead this researcher to believe that 
this highly demanding environment requires a different approach to the maximization of 
team performance. 
Some of the behaviors seen in these high performing groups include establishing 
strict communication protocols by the Commander, emphasizing the importance of 
synchronization matrix use, providing basic parameters for financial expenditures, and 
imposing deadlines for delivery of vital information (e.g., requesting info from the 
Supply Team by the five minute mark). These behaviors were established by reviews of 
current military doctrine established for command group collaboration during timed-
constrained, (Department of the Army, 2005; Kelly & Karau, 1999) distributed 
environments (Standing Joint Force Headquarters and The Collaboration Information 
Environment Management Office, 2005). For the high performing groups, all of the 
above behaviors were exhibited by the Commander and his teams within the first five 
minutes of the exercise. In contrast, the five distributed command groups that failed to 
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have funds available at the onset of Week Four utilized the synchronization matrix rarely, 
thus necessitating frequent repetition of information. 
Furthermore, while the Commanders in these two high performing distributed 
groups were actively involved in the collaborative process, they avoided micromanaging 
the situation by serving as consolidators of information. This, in turn, allowed individual 
teams to perform their assigned functions without undue interference. These 
Commanders also emphasized unavoidable losses and the inevitability of a less than 
perfect outcome. These Commanders also communicated with their teams early, thus 
providing their teams with ample time to complete the exercise. 
These positive findings notwithstanding, the current study possessed several 
limitations. First, despite the intentions of the researcher to create a realistic simulation, it 
is exactly that - simply a simulation. As such, there are no "real" consequences, while in 
real-life the consequences can be as extreme as the loss of life. In reality command 
groups operate with a degree of stress and responsibility that we simply cannot ethically 
simulate. 
Secondly, the number of command groups which participated (N = 14) was 
actually fairly small, and thus, the study was limited by a lack of statistical power. While 
a larger sample size would certainly have been desired, due to overseas deployments and 
operation requirements, it was extremely difficult to obtain active duty servicemen and 
women for this project. 
Future research issues 
The current situations in Iraq and Afghanistan require that many roles be filled 
with military-affiliated personnel (e.g., security personnel). While this phenomenon has 
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existed for quite some time, its scope has increased. Feedback from participants is 
consistent with this observation. Because opportunities to train these types of skills (e.g., 
dealing with non-military personnel) are scarce, the REPSS system could potentially 
provide a means of providing needed practice in a low-risk setting. 
Because the REPSS system requires participants to adjust their plans based on 
outcomes in a dynamic environment, the REPSS system also, arguably, could serve as a 
benchmark for adaptable thinking. Recent military literature indicates that adaptivity is 
increasingly important in today's operational environment (Wong, 2004). Other future 
research endeavors utilizing the REPSS system could examine novice versus expert 
command group performance, thus bridging the gap between the present study and 
previous research (Carnahan, Lickteig, Sanders, Durlach, & Lussier, 2004). 
When conducting applied behavioral research, it is often necessary to pre-specify 
the kinds and numbers of participants required. This can often be a problem, especially in 
the current situation when dealing with small to moderate effect sizes and limited 
participant availability. All of the preceding factors adversely affect power. 
Because this was the initial investigative effort, it was not feasible to specify all 
the salient individual differences that may play a role in command group decision 
making. However, given that the current experiment has yielded evidence for divergent 
performance profiles of collocated and distributed command groups, future research 
efforts may focus upon the role of both individual- and team-level attributes and their 
implications for performance. Future considerations may also utilize tighter controls to 
isolate key factors. 
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Conclusion 
The results of the present research indicate that planning synchronization is 
significantly related to the successful delivery of humanitarian supplies. However, 
contrary to expectations, synchronization scores, although approaching traditional levels 
of statistical significance, were not different between collocated and distributed groups. 
Therefore, sample size limitations may be responsible for this outcome. 
The differences in humanitarian supply delivery rate between collocated and 
distributed command groups are distinct and appear to be primarily driven by the joint 
effect of previous decisions and dwindling resources. The fact that these differences were 
observed in the current experiment, combined with participant feedback indicating 
participants saw the value of REPSS in potentially improving command group 
performance, support the recommendation for REPSS as a command group training 
platform. 
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GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
Your group is part of a multi-national operation to assist in the reconstruction of Azerbaijan after a violent 
civil war. The operation objective is to provide a consistent supply of humanitarian support to war torn 
towns. Your group will plan and execute a humanitarian relief campaign, and will consist of a: 
• Commander 
• Supply Team 
• Motor Transport Team 
• Security Team 
Your role in this operation is to assemble four weekly humanitarian support shipments to citizens in four 
towns. The towns are code named: 
• Alpha 
• Echo 
• India 
• Oscar 
The towns are dynamic and distinctive in many respects. This includes: 
• Population 
• Citizen Morale (CITMOR) 
• Threat Level for routes and towns 
• Terrain 
• Weather 
You will have forty minutes to develop and execute your plan for Week 1. This will consist of allocating 
limited funds to each team to develop a synchronized plan that will maximize the amount of humanitarian 
supplies reaching towns. You will execute the plan by purchasing goods and services necessary to send a 
separate relief convoy to each town, and then monitor the results. You will have twenty minutes to develop 
each of the follow-on plans for the next three weeks of the operation. 
The REPSS program will simulate the reaction from citizens and insurgents to your weekly relief convoys in 
the form of text messages. You will need to adjust your plan to improve citizen morale, limit insurgent 
attacks, and maximize humanitarian supply delivery. 
The goods and services used for each humanitarian relief convoy will be obtained from contractors. All 
non-perishable products, such as vehicles and personnel, will be hired on a week-to-week basis. 
No convoy personnel (drivers, security guards, town guards) are United States military personnel. 
Appendix B 
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COMMANDER'S INSTRUCTIONS 
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HIGHER COMMAND'S GUIDANCE 
• Feed as many civilians as possible with available funds 
• The total budget for the four-week operation is 7.4 million dollars. This amount is not sufficient 
to purchase 100% of the humanitarian supplies required for each town if you also purchase the 
best transportation vehicles, storage facilities, and large numbers of the best security guards. 
• As the Commander, you must lead the planning process to achieve a synchronized plan that 
balances the allocation of resources across the four towns, and four weeks, tailoring convoys 
to meet the changing conditions of each town. 
• Achieve a balanced distribution of food across the four towns, for all four weeks. 
• Your group's performance score will be based on the percentage of required humanitarian 
supplies that are successfully distributed in each town. 
• Losses due to attacks by insurgents, accidents, and theft (in transit or at warehouses) will 
reduce the percentage of supplies successfully distributed. 
As the Commander, you must lead the group to: 
• Identify HSU and warehouse requirements/recommendations for each town 
Identify transportation requirements/recommendations to accomplish food shipment 
• Estimate security guard requirements/recommendations 
• Identify options/tradeoffs to maximize the HSU that can be delivered to towns over the four-week 
period. Do your best to spread out the delivery of HSU across the four weeks. 
• Ensure that each team has a resource allocation request entered in the computer each week 
(every 20 minutes) 
The Commander has the authority to make any decision he deems necessary in this exercise, but he can 
delegate authority to individual teams. Your role is to ensure that the group remains motivated and uses 
their time wisely. 
Your group will have 40 minutes to complete your initial plan, and then twenty minutes to execute the plan 
for each of the following weeks. 
The score your group obtains depends on the effectiveness of the initial plan and your ability to adapt with 
the changing environment in subsequent decisions. One unit of HSU will feed 100 people for one week. A 
town of 1000 people would thus receive 10 HSU per week under the best conditions. If the town received 
only nine HSU during the week then your score would be 90%. Overall success in distributing food to 
towns will be a function of the final percentage of food delivered to each town, as well as the equality of 
distribution across towns. There are no bonuses for having money remaining at the end of the exercise so 
spend all of your available funds. 
Appendix C 
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Your primary role as the Supply Team is to purchase Humanitarian Supply Units (HSU) and rent 
Distribution Centers for four towns in Azerbaijan. The pricing guide is provided in your team 
packet on the ServCo Products and Services sheet. 
Each unit of HSU provides food, non-food necessities, and basic medical supplies to meet the 
needs for one hundred people for one week. The civilians of the four towns that your group is 
providing HSU to do not have the resources needed to support themselves. Your shipments of 
HSU are the only source they have for the necessary supplies they need to survive. 
Distribution Centers are preexisting structures within each town that ServCo Products and 
Services have secured as rental sites to use for your mission. Distribution Centers have two 
purposes. First, they provide storage for units of HSU once they are delivered to that town. Your 
group needs to ensure that the number of units of HSU delivered does not exceed the listed 
capacity for the Distribution Centers in that town. HSU left unsecured outside of a Distribution 
Center have an increased chance of being pilfered and vandalized. Second, Distribution Centers 
provide protection for HSU, Town Security Guards, and support personnel who are working in 
the area in the event of an attack by enemy forces. 
Two types of Distribution Centers are offered, Fortified Distribution Centers and Distribution 
Centers (non-fortified), with each providing different levels of protection. Fortified Distribution 
Centers have upgraded security wire, anti-vehicle barricades, and protective materials on 
structures. The standard Distribution Centers are the buildings as is, with no extra security 
measures provided. 
Distribution Center support employees include, but are not limited to; a supervisor, assistants, 
maintenance workers, and dockworkers. HQ Battalion of Camp Puller, as per contract agreement 
with ServCo Products and Services, will cover the basic cost of employment for these personnel. 
However, any injuries or loss of life and damaged property will be the financial responsibility of 
your team. 
Your team needs to be aware of the Citizen Morale (CITMOR) status of each town, which is 
likely to change over time. The CITMOR code is provided by S2 to indicate the current morale 
of the native population for a particular region (town). This takes into account how well the 
population's HSU needs are being met, their faith in the operation currently being conducted by 
coalition forces, and in addition, the threat of violence from insurgents. 
The coding system for CITMOR is provided below: 
• VERY LOW - At this level, citizens of this region will exhibit hostile behaviors towards 
coalition forces and will attempt to undermine coalition objectives. 
• LOW - At this level, citizens will display apathetic, unfriendly behaviors towards 
coalition forces, but will stop short of violent, hostile displays. Many will not offer their 
assistance to coalition forces, unless it directly benefits the people of their town. 
• NEUTRAL - At this level, citizens of the particular region are indifferent towards 
coalition forces and their goals. They do not consider them as helpful or as harmful, but 
rather as witnesses to the plight of their people. 
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• HIGH - At this level, citizens see coalition forces as benefactors and will assist coalition 
forces in daily chores they perform, such as unloading supply trucks, constructing roads, 
buildings, and similar type behaviors. 
• VERY HIGH - At this level, citizens revere coalition forces and consider them friends. 
They will perform duties such as ferreting out enemy forces within town and will do what 
they can to promote peace within their region between the enemy and coalition forces. 
Appendix D 
Motor Transport Team's Instructions 
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The Motor Transport Team will be required to decide on the number and type of trucks to rent 
each week for transportation of humanitarian supplies (HSU) and Security Guards. Security 
Guards will be hired each week by the Security Team to keep your vehicles, HSU, and drivers 
safe. The pricing guide for transportation vehicles is included in your team instructions in the 
Military Vehicle Surplus, Inc. sheet, which follows. 
In addition, your team will need to monitor the current weather conditions and terrain within 
each respective region and the threat level for each route. In the REPSS Exercise, weather and 
terrain will affect your convoys in a similar fashion as they would in real life. Threat Level 
determines the Weather information will be provided for each region in the description of each 
town on the team data entry screen. 
Trucks come in two models, Five-Ton, the standard truck, and Armored Five-Ton. Armored 
Five-Tons offer better protection for the HSU, Security Guards onboard, and the vehicle itself, in 
the case of an enemy attack, due to bulletproof glass, armor plating, and self-sealing tires. You 
can rent a mix of armored and unarmored trucks for each town convoy. 
Trucks can carry up to four units of HSU at one time or up to twenty Security Guards. You can 
have a vehicle carrying both HSU and Security Guards together. As a rule of thumb, an HSU 
container takes up the same space as 5 Security Guards. 
Truck rental includes the cost of convoy leaders, drivers and assistant drivers. However, any 
injuries or damaged property will be the financial responsibility of your team, with the cost of 
damages automatically deducted from your group's funds. 
Trucks provide transportation of HSU to each town. To ensure the safety of your cargo, you need 
to request Route Security Guards from the Security Team. Town Security Guards are the 
responsibility of the Security Team and will travel ahead of each convoy and secure the town and 
delivery area. Route Security Guards will travel with the convoy and protect the trucks and HSU 
from attack by enemy forces along the route. The Motor Transport Team DOES NOT rent 
vehicles for Town Security Personnel. Other coalition forces are providing transportation for 
Town Security Guards. 
To determine the minimum recommended amount of Route Security Guards your trucks need for 
each route, refer to the chart below. 
• LOW THREAT LEVEL - 1 Security Guard per Five-Ton 
• GUARDED THREAT LEVEL - 1 Security Guard per Five-Ton 
• ELEVATED THREAT LEVEL - 2 Security Guards per Five-Ton 
• HIGH THREAT LEVEL - 3 Security Guards per Five-Ton 
• SEVERE THREAT LEVEL - 4 Security Guards per Five-Ton 
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Your primary role as the Security Team is to determine the number and type of Security Guards 
to hire on a week-to-week basis. Your team will need to provide an adequate number of Town 
Security Guards to secure the delivery area while the supply convoy is in the town unloading 
their cargo, as well as providing additional Route Security Guards requested by the Motor 
Transport Team to protect the convoys while they are enroute to the area secured by the Town 
Security Guards. The pricing guide for security guards is included in your team instructions on 
the Security Service Staffing sheet, which follows. 
Town Security Guards will travel ahead of each Motor Transport Team convoy and secure the 
delivery area. Route Security Guards will travel with the convoy and protect the trucks and HSU 
from attack by enemy forces along the route. 
The two types of Security Guards which you can employee are Professional Security Guards and 
Civilian Security Guards. 
Professional Security Guards will offer better protection in the event of an attack by enemy 
forces as well as serving as a deterrent from attack. Professional Security Guards are persons 
with military and/or law enforcement backgrounds already employed by Security Service 
Staffing. 
Civilian Security Guards are local civilians trained to perform the basic, minimal security duties. 
They will be less capable of providing security compared to the Professional Security Guards, 
but employing them will gradually have a positive affect on the region's Citizen Morale 
(CITMOR) level in which they are employed. 
You will hire Route Security Guards and Town Security Guards on a weekly basis. Any injuries 
to guards or loss of life will result in a financial penalty automatically withdrawn from the 
group's funds during the week in which the loss occurs. To determine how many Town 
Security Guards you for each town, refer to the chart below. 
Based on the THREATCON for the region, you will need: 
• LOW THREATCON - 2 Security Guards per 100 inhabitants 
• GUARDED THREATCON - 4 Security Guards per 100 inhabitants 
• ELEVATED THREATCON - 6 Security Guards per 100 inhabitants 
• HIGH THREATCON - 8 Security Guards per 100 inhabitants 
• SEVERE THREATCON - 10 Security Guards per 100 inhabitants 
Confer with the Motor Transport Team to find out the number of Route Security Guards they 
need for your team to hire. The Motor Transport Team DOES NOT rent vehicles for Town 
Security Personnel. Other coalition forces are providing transportation for Town Security 
Guards. You simply have to allocate Town Guards for their respective towns. Your group will 
have to provide transportation for Route Security Guards. 
Town Security Guards cannot serve as Route Security Guards and vice versa. Town Security 
Guards will travel ahead of each Motor Transport Team convoy and secure the town and the 
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delivery area, while Route Security Guards will travel with the convoy and protect the vehicles 
and supplies from attack by enemy forces along the route. Their job description indicates that 
Route Security Guards escort the vehicles to the town, where Town Security Guards then 
provide security for vehicles. Until the vehicles return to the route to travel back to Camp Puller, 
Route Security Guards will remain outside of town. 
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Workload and Performance Success 
REPSS Team: Date: 
Task Load Index Rating Scales 
Please rate the exercise by putting a mark on each of the six scales at the point that matches your 
experience. 
Mental 
Demand 
Very Low 
(HOW MENTALLY DEMANDING WAS THE EXERCISE?) 
Very High 
Physical 
Demand 
Very Low 
(HOW PHYSICALLY DEMANDING WAS THE EXERCISE?) 
Very High 
Temporal 
Demand 
Very Low 
(HOW HURRIED OR RUSHED WAS THE PACE OF THE EXERCISE?) 
Very High 
Performance 
?erfect Failure 
(HOW SUCCESSFUL WERE YOU IN ACCOMPLISHING WHAT YOU WERE ASKED TO 
DO?) 
Effort 
Very Low Very High 
(HOW HARD DID YOU HAVE TO WORK TO ACCOMPLISH YOUR LEVEL OF 
PERFORMANCE?) 
Frustration 
Very Low 
(HOW DISCOURAGED, IRRITATED OR ANNOYED WERE YOU 
Very High 
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Group Roles Questionnaire PT 60-94 
REPSS Team: Date: 
For each question below, please check the best answer. 
1. Which vehicle can transport more Security Guards: Armored or Unarmored Trucks? 
• The same amount • Armored 
• Unarmored • Trucks do not transport Security Guards 
2. How many people will one unit of HSU supply for one week? 
• 10 • Depends on the THREATCON Level 
• 250 • 100 
3. Which town newspaper provided misleading or errant information? 
• Alpha • Echo 
• India • Oscar • None 
4. What team (Supply, Motor Transport, Security) was provided CITMOR scores? 
• Supply • Motor Transport 
• Security • All 
5. How much money was the Commander provided for the mission? 
• $6.2 Million • $8.0 Million 
• $7.4 Million • $7.9 Million 
6. A Fortified Distribution Center is as effective as an unfortified Distribution Center in protecting against 
an attack. 
• Twice • Three Times 
• The Same • Half 
7. What team (Supply, Motor Transport, Security) was provided Town THREATCON scores? 
• Supply • Motor Transport 
• Security • All 
8. What information did the Commander have available to him/her? 
• Town Population • Newspapers 
• S2 SITREPS • None of these 
57 
Group Roles Questionnaire (continued) PT 60-94 
Situation: A new command group assigned to a different area of operations in Azerbaijan has requested your 
recommendations in planning their humanitarian relief effort. You have agreed to assist. After the election of the 
coalition supported Etibar Isa Alizade, insurgents have infiltrated Town Yankee and have taken control of portions 
of the town. There are two routes to Town Yankee, Yankee Route 1, which has a bridge spanning a large river, and 
Yankee Route 2, which is a road of similar construction that follows a land route of slightly greater distance. 
Provided below is information available for the Town Yankee region. 
When answering the questions below assume: 1) that you have enough funds to purchase 100% of the 
recommended HSU, security guards, and transportation, and 2) the action that you took in the REPSS exercise are 
appropriate in supporting Town Yankee. 
Town Yankee Population: 3600 
Town Yankee THREATCON: VERY HIGH 
Terrain: MOUNTAIN 
Town Yankee CITMOR: 
Weather: 
VERY LOW 
BLIZZARD 
Yankee Route 1 THREATCON: HIGH 
Yankee Route 2 THREATCON: HIGH 
1. What type of Security Guards should be allocated to Town Yankee? 
• Professional • Civilian 
2. What type of Trucks should be utilized to transport HSU and Security Guards to Town Yankee? 
• Armored • Unarmored 
3. Which route should you use to get to Town Yankee? 
• Yankee Route 1 • Yankee Route 2 
4. How many units of HSU should be provided to feed the entire population in Town Yankee? 
• 9 • 360 
• 36 • 45 
Appendix H 
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Demographic Survey 
59 
PT 60-94 
Name 
REPSS Team 
Current Rank/Grade 
Age. 
• Active Duty • Army Reserve 
Date 
Branch/MOS. 
AOC/MOS 
• National Guard 
1. What is your current duty position?. 
2. How many months in current duty position? _ 
3. Time in military service: 
Officer: Years Months 
Enlisted: Years Months 
4. Prior Leader/Staff Experience (and time in position) 
5. Please check all operations you have been deployed in: 
• Iraq (OIF) • Afghanistan (OEF) 
• Kosovo • Bosnia 
• Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm 
• Other 
6. How long has it been since you last participated in a group planning session? (Describe) 
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7. If you related your experience with commercial computer applications in terms of years, where would 
you place yourself on the chart below? 
(Circle a number please.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
No Less Than More Than More Than 5 Years 
Experience 1 year 1 year 3 years or More 
8. How much experience do you have using computer systems to conduct military planning? 
(Circle a number please.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
No Less Than More Than More Than 5 Years 
Experience 1 year 1 year 3 years or More 
9. How much experience do you have performing Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP) in group 
planning tasks such as you experienced in the REPSS exercise? 
(Circle a number please.) 
1 2 3 4 5 
No Less Than More Than More Than 5 Years 
Experience 1 year 1 year 3 years or More 
10. How many members of your experiment group have you worked with before on planning tasks? 
